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ABSTRACT: Mental causation, though a forceful intuition embedded in our commonsense psychology, is difficult to 
square with the rest of commitments of physicalism about the mind. Advocates of mental causation have 
found solace in the causal inheritance principle, according to which the mental properties of mental states 
share the causal powers of their physical counterparts. In this paper, I present a variety of counterargu-
ments to causal inheritance and conclude that the conditions for causal inheritance are stricter than what 
standing versions of said principle imply. In line with this, physicalism may be destined to epiphenomenal-
ism unless multiple realizability turns out false. 
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1. The causal exclusion problem 
It is virtually a platitude of commonsense psychology that our mental states are causal-
ly efficacious. Examples abound in daily life which seemingly illustrate that our mental 
lives are causally relevant with respect to the happenings in the world. For instance, 
what caused me to go to 7-11 after dinner last Friday (we can call this effect E) was 
my desire to buy a pint of Ben & Jerry’s paired with my belief that 7-11 has a wide selec-
tion (let’s call this belief-desire pair my mental state M). Voilà, mental causation. Con-
trary to the prevailing view in folk psychology, it has seemed far from straightforward 
to physicalists about the mind how exactly the mental properties of our mental states 
might introduce their own causal powers in a physical world that is causally closed and 
complete. The problem of explaining how this might be has been dubbed the causal ex-
clusion problem (Kim 1989, 1993, 1998, 2005) and is typically formulated as the inconsis-
tency between some variant of the following four propositions: 
1. Causal Closure of Physics: If a physical event, E, has a cause that occurs at a 
given time t, it has a physical cause, P, that occurs at t.  
2. Nonreductionism: Mental properties, Ms, are not reducible to, and are not 
identical with, physical properties, Ps. 
                                                     
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the Workshop on “Rationality, Knowledge and Causal 
Action” at the University of Granada, held on the 17th and 18th of June 2010. Thank you to Helen 
Beebee, Josep Corbí, María José García Encinas, Christian Piller, Manuel de Pinedo, Murali 
Ramachandran and Josefa Toribio for their stimulating questions and discussion. Thank you also to 
the editors of Theoria and to an anonymous reviewer for their insightful suggestions and expert guid-
ance.   
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3. Mental Causation: Mental properties have causal efficacy ―that is, their in-
stantiations can, and do, cause other properties, both mental and physical to 
be instantiated. 
4. Exclusion: No single event, E, can have more than one sufficient cause occur-
ring at any given time t, unless it is a genuine case of causal overdetermina-
tion.  
 These premises have all seemed plausible to many philosophers in the debate 
about mental causation but, evidently, one of them must go in order to be left with a 
coherent picture. The causal closure of physics claims that the physical world as po-
sited by ideal physics is causally and nomologically complete and closed, i.e., for each 
and every physical event there is a sufficient cause in prior physical events plus the laws 
of physics which govern them. In the 7-11 case, E ―or my arrival at 7-11 after dinner 
on Friday night― has a sufficient cause to be found in the previous physical events, 
let’s say, a series of neural firings and muscle contractions, P 1. Nonreductionism 
about the mental is the view that, although mental properties like M do supervene on 
physical properties like P, they are not reducible to them. My desiring to buy a pint of 
Ben & Jerry’s ice cream supervenes on, but is not reducible to, the neurophysiological 
state I’m in when I desire to buy a pint.  
Supervenience: If any system s instantiates a mental property M, at t, 
there necessarily exists a physical property P, such that s instantiates P at 
t, and necessarily anything instantiating P at any time instantiates M at 
that time.2 
Nonreductionism is buttressed most markedly by the widely-accepted phenomenon of 
multiple realizability. In a classic paper, Putnam (1967) revealed just how stringent the 
empirical commitments of the, then popular, psychophysical type-identity theory are. 
For every mental state M, the identity theorist ―Putnam denounced― is committed to 
specifying a single neurophysiological state, P, which those and only those nomologi-
cally possible systems capable of instantiating M must realize whenever they instan-
tiate M. The perceived unlikelihood that type-identity theory could meet this demand 
meant its early demise. The prevailing view now says that mental property-types are 
multiply realizable, in the sense that any mental property-type can be realized by a 
possibly infinite range of different neurophysiological and physical bases since, in dif-
ferent species and structure-types with different biochemical and physical composi-
tions, they are as a matter of fact implemented in dissimilar ways.  
Multiple Realizability: For every physical property P and mental prop-
erty M which supervenes on P, possibly something instantiates M but not 
P. 
                                                     
1 To be sure, neural firings and muscle contraction are events at the neurophysiological level. Admittedly, I’m 
using a vague notion of ‘physical’ with which intend to designate everything ranging from neurophysi-
ological, through biological and chemical, down to microphysical.   
2 I’ll assume, along with Kim, that supervenience is a necessary condition for physicalism, and that the 
consequences of supervenience hold by nomological, rather than logical, necessity.  
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Furthermore, as Segal has noted, multiple realizability is probably the norm between 
individual cognizers or even cognizers-during-periods. For certain thin mental proper-
ties ―he uses the example of the pain caused by burning ―there may be a single rea-
lizer across a whole species, but “talk of species is not appropriate for lots of interest-
ing psychological states. Consider propositional attitudes, for example. It is very un-
likely that a given propositional attitude, such as the belief that Barcelona is beautiful, 
will have the same physical realizations in different people, or, perhaps, in the same 
individual at different times” (Segal 2009, p. 87). Although Kim has argued that it is 
compatible with reductionism, according to the prevailing view, multiple realizability is 
typically recruited in support of nonreductionism about the mental: reducing a given 
mental property to its neurophysiological and physical realization bases would involve 
its replacement by a disjunctive, even a wildly or infinitely disjunctive, property. Dis-
junctive properties of this sort are not scientific kinds and the regularities in which 
they figure are neither genuine laws nor explanations (Fodor, 1974; Pereboom & 
Kornblith 1991). 
 Exclusion is roughly the claim that overdetermination is exceptional rather than 
pervasive in the physical world. Consequently, mental causation ―which if it exists is 
certainly pervasive― cannot overdetermine its effects. Unlike the victim whose death, 
E, is genuinely overdetermined by C1, one of the arrows to her heart at t, and C2, the 
other such arrow, proponents of exclusion claim that the mental and physical proper-
ties cannot both be sufficient and simultaneous causes of any subsequent effects.  
 So, let’s look at the picture painted by the causal exclusion problem. According to 
the causal closure of physics, P is causally sufficient for E. If M is not reducible to P, 
we have two candidates at hand for the role of sufficient cause of E. We might defend 
that both M and P are causally sufficient and put forth a version of causal compatibilism 
(Horgan 2001, 2007; Pereboom, 2002). Causal compatibilism makes room for psy-
chology as a genuine, explanatory, and autonomous scientific discipline at the cost of 
denying exclusion and having to explain away worries about causal overdetermination. 
If one is persuaded by exclusionary reasoning, the choices are to either assert that P is 
causally sufficient and M is not, thereby forfeiting mental causation and embracing epi-
phenomenalism, or to claim that M is causally sufficient and P is not, in which case we 
violate the causal closure of physics3. These are dreary and unpalatable outcomes to 
the robust physicalist who is also a mental realist. If, as Kim has argued, M is reducible 
to P, which is notoriously a matter of dispute among contemporary physicalists, then 
by denying nonreductionism we can save mental causation without violating exclu-
sion. On this view, mental causation happens in virtue of the identity or reducibility 
relation between a mental property and any one of the physical properties which real-
ize it, such that the causal path from M to E coincides with the causal path from P to 
E. None of the alleged solutions to the causal exclusion problem is altogether satisfy-
ing. Each seems to boast some intuitive appeal at the cost of some counterintuitive 
loss or other: alas, the nature of the beast of causal exclusion. 
                                                     
3 The latter is the implicit solution furthered by counterfactual theoretic account of mental causation, and 
one that I will argue should not be dismissed too quickly by those seeking to uphold mental causation. 
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2. Causal inheritance and mental causation 
On the physicalist picture of causation introduced earlier and assumed by Kim, Pere-
boom and by many self-ascribed physicalists, there are no token causal powers other 
than those occurring at the microphysical level. The only hope for special-scientific 
causation rests on higher-level properties staking a claim to the causal powers of mi-
crophysical properties. In Kim’s words: 
[T]o be a cause of E, M must somehow ride piggyback on physical cause chains. And we 
may ask in virtue of what relation it bears to physical property P does M earn its entitle-
ment to a free ride on the causal chain from P to E and to claim this causal chain to be its 
own (2005, p. 48)?4 
 Reductionists and nonreductionists, of course, give quite different answers to this 
question and defend corresponding versions of the causal inheritance principle. According 
to reductionists, for higher-level properties to be causally efficacious, they must be re-
ducible to the microphysical level. If they are, then any token causal powers of a high-
er-level property will be identical with some token microphysical causal powers. The 
reductionist counters the multiple realizability argument by arguing for local reducibility. 
It is an assumption of the defender of multiple realizability, that every realizer P of a 
mental property M is nomologically sufficient for M. But, as Kim (1989, p. 38) has ar-
gued, multiple realizability seems in fact to presuppose laws of a “somewhat stronger 
form”, according to which, relative to species or structure si, a physical state, Pi, is 
both necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of mental state M; i.e, si → (M ↔ Pi). 
Thus, the conclusion we ought to draw, according to Kim, is that “the multiple reali-
zability of the mental has no antireductionist implications of great significance; on the 
contrary, it entails, or at least is consistent with, the local reducibility of psychology, 
local relative to species or physical structure-types” (1989, p. 39).  
Causal Inheritance Principle (CIP): If mental property M is realized in 
a system at time t in virtue of physical realization base P, the causal pow-
ers of this instance of M are identical with the causal powers of P (Kim 
1993, p. 326).  
By contrast, nonreductionists, such as Horgan and Pereboom, argue that the weaker 
metaphysical relation that according to them holds between mental and physical prop-
erties and warrants the irreducibility of the former to the latter is, nonetheless, strong 
enough for them to share causal powers. Unlike Kim, they take multiple realizability 
―as is standard practice― to support nonreductionism. In addition, because M is mul-
tiply realizable, not only is M token distinct from its physical realizer P, but M’s causal 
powers must also be distinct from, but “nothing over and above”, those of P. Thus, 
Weaker Causal Inheritance Principle (WCIP): If mental property M 
is realized in a system at t in virtue of physical realization base P, the 
                                                     
4 This quote has insignificant relettering to cohere with my choice of M for ‘mental property’, P for 
‘physical property’ and E for ‘effect’. In the remainder of this paper, I take the liberty to make similar, 
minimal changes to a quote where the author has preferred to use other letters.  
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causal powers of this instance of M are wholly constituted by the causal 
powers of P (Pereboom 2002, p. 504). 
Causal inheritance is an intuitive and plausible way to sneak mental causation into a 
physicalist picture of causation at large. It may, moreover, be a crucial element of any 
successful and persuasive defense of mental causation. My contention, however, is 
that the causal inheritance principle has not been carefully formulated and is subject to 
a variety of counterarguments against which it should be defended by physicalist ad-
vocates of mental causation. More careful philosophical attention ought to be placed 
on the phenomenon of causal inheritance and, consequently, on a precise and correct 
formulation of the principle. Throughout Sections 3 to 5, I will argue that the condi-
tions under which causal inheritance takes place are stricter than what the standing 
versions of the causal inheritance principle imply.  
3. Is the causal inheritance principle valid? 
The causal inheritance principle purports to specify the conditions under which, and 
the extent to which, an instance of a mental property can be said to inherit the causal 
powers of its physical realization base5. In the CIP formulation, it suffices for M to be 
realized or instantiated in virtue of property P. Note that that is a substantially weaker re-
quirement than: 
CIP-R: If mental property M is reducible in a system si at time t to its 
physical realization base Pi, the causal powers of this instance of M are 
identical with the causal powers of Pi. 
It seems that CIP-R does have some prima facie plausibility (which it will be the object 
of Section 5 to examine). After all, since for M to be reducible in sk to Pk entails some 
identity-like metaphysical relation, it is plausible that, when they stand in said relation, 
M and Pk confer an identical set of dispositions to sk and that M thereby inherits the 
causal powers of Pk. It is likely that this is what Kim indeed means by CIP and that he 
simply assumes that for M to be realized by P just is for M to be reducible to P. Never-
theless, I think this point is noteworthy because, so formulated, CIP is compatible 
with supervenient causation. Suppose it turned out that nonreductionism were the 
truth about the mind-body problem, viz., that M supervenes on, but is not reducible 
to, P. On this picture, M would indeed be realized by P and would, by CIP, inherit the 
causal powers of P. But Kim explicitly shuns this kind of causation: 
[…] why not say that M, though it doesn’t quite have the status of P in relation to E, is a 
derivative cause of E in virtue of its supervenience on P? M is not an independent cause 
of E; its causal status derives from its supervenience on the causally active P. …inserting 
                                                     
5 For a substantive account of causal powers, see Mumford, 2009. Kim doesn’t say much about what he 
takes causal powers to be, so it’ll be helpful to keep Mumford’s account in bmind. In a nutshell, Mum-
ford defends (i) that “powers are the causes of their manifestations”, that (ii) events are polygenic in that 
“they are produced by many powers working together, or against each other,” and that (iii) powers are 
pleiotropic, i.e., they “can contribute to many different types of event in different circumstances” (Mum-
ford 2009, pp. 102-4). 
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a broken-dot arrow [between M and E] and calling it supervenient causation, or anything 
else (how about “pretend” or “faux” causation?), does not alter the situation one bit. It 
neither adds any new facts nor reveals any hitherto unnoticed relationships (Kim 2003, p. 
171). 
It seems that Kim would want his formulation of the causal inheritance principle to be 
foolproof against this possibility. Since, even if he doesn’t, Kim’s account seems to 
demand reduction as a condition for causal inheritance, I will proceed in Section 5 as 
if CIP-R is the intended formulation of the causal inheritance principle for conserva-
tive reductionism and deal in Section 4 with causal inheritance in a nonreductionist 
framework.  
4. Nonreductionism and causal inheritance 
How can irreducible mental properties inherit the causal powers of their physical rea-
lizers in virtue of the former’s mere supervenience on the latter? There are two ver-
sions of this question corresponding to two different degrees to which causal inherit-
ance is defended by nonreductionists. Horgan, in his causal contextualist account 
(2001), seems to assume that full causal inheritance is warranted between supervenient 
and subvenient properties in virtue of something like CIP; while Pereboom’s causal 
compatibilism (2002) makes the weaker claim, which I have labeled partial causal inhe-
ritance, that supervenient mental properties share some of the causal powers of their 
physical realizers in virtue of WCIP. The object of this section will be to tackle these 
two varieties of causal inheritance in a nonreductionist framework and ultimately to 
argue that neither CIP nor WCIP hold for irreducible mental properties.  
4.1. Full causal inheritance: the case of causal contextualism 
In his classic “Mental Causation”, Yablo brought back the determinate-determinable 
relation to characterize the psychophysical, arguing that “such a view is in fact implicit 
in the reigning orthodoxy about mind-body relations, namely, that the mental is super-
venient on, but multiply realizable in, the physical” (1992, p. 254). On his view of proper-
ties,   
P determines Q (P > Q) only if: 
(i) necessarily, for all x, if x has P then x has Q; and, 
(ii) possibly, for some x, x has Q but lacks P (Yablo 1992, p. 252). 
 In other words, when M supervenes on and is multiply realizable by P1, P2 … Pi, 
then P1, P2 … Pi can be said to determine M. Similar pairs of determinable and determinate 
properties are being red and being scarlet, having a shape and being triangular, having a weight 
and weighing three kilograms, etc. Yablo appealed to this determination relation ultimately 
to shed light on how M might outdo P in the competition for causal relevance in vir-
tue of its proportionality to E. Here I intend to apply this relation for other purposes: 
namely, to show how, for some class of Es, E causally depends on P but not M. 
 Suppose I drive home and thereby instantiate the property of speeding home. Since 
speeding home is driving home in a specific way, i.e., a determinate of driving home, whatever 
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instantiates the speeding home property instantiates also the driving home property. Now 
we may ask: does this instance of driving home have the causal powers of speeding home as 
CIP supposes? It seems obvious to me that, on the contrary, the speeding home has a 
range of causal powers ―e.g., to make the car skid off an icy road― which the driving 
home does not have. These causal powers are unique to the determinate property pre-
cisely because the determinate property is a more refined property than is the deter-
minable property6. These are causal powers that other determinations of the relevant 
determinable property do not share with the determinate property in question; and eo 
ipso causal powers that the determinable property does not share with the determinate 
property. Thus, it is possible for the subvening or determinate property to have causal 
powers that the supervening or determinable property does not inherit.  
 It may be objected that, while the driving home-type indeed does not inherit the 
causal powers of the speeding home-type, this instance of the driving home property does. 
This line of response seems to confuse this instance of a driving home event, which has 
the causal power to make the car skid off an icy road (in virtue of the causally relevant 
property which we are trying to identify), with this instance of a driving home property 
which does not have such causal power.  
 Compare the following two causal explanations identifying the causally relevant 
property. The causal explanation:  
My car skid off the icy road because I was driving home  
sounds like it is missing crucial, causally relevant information which  
My car skid off the icy road because I was speeding home 
is not. The paucity of supervenient causal explanation stems from the fact that it 
leaves out information about the subvening property which is crucial to the event’s 
causal powers. Invoking the driving home property in the first causal explanation to ex-
plain what made my car to skid off the icy road is a way of leaving out that kind of 
causally relevant information. By contrast, citing the speeding home property cited as the 
relevant property in virtue of which the driving home event led to the car’s skidding 
off the icy road results in a robust causal explanation. It, of course, won’t help advo-
cates of supervenient causation to insist that the driving home property inherits the 
causal powers of the speeding home property by saying that this instance of the driving 
home property in fact is a speeding home property: this is reductionist, not supervenient, 
causal inheritance.  
 It may be helpful to support the above case with an example from the psychologi-
cal domain. Consider a studying event which results in my burning 50 extra calories. 
What was the causally relevant property in virtue of which my studying resulted in my 
burning 50 extra calories? Was it M or Pk, i.e., the supervenient property of memorizing 
every word on the GRE Hot List or some subvenient neurophysical property involving in-
                                                     
6 The more refined property, on Yablo’s  view I am adopting here, is the property with the larger cumula-
tive essence or the property it is “more difficult to be” insofar as “a thing’s [cumulative] essence speci-
fies what it takes to be that thing” (Yablo 1987, p.299). 
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tensive neural communication between the hippocampus, medial temporal lobe and other memory-
related areas? It seems here too that Pk is what caused me to burn 50 extra calories. If I 
were a MacBook Pro, a Leibnizian monad or simply another human being with a 
slightly different brain, blood glucose level or heart rate, I would instantiate property 
M by instantiating some different physical realizer Pl and without causing precisely the 
same effect. Contrarily, it seems like someone exhibiting the very same, complex sub-
venient property, Pk, would also thereby burn 50 extra calories in all worlds compati-
ble with the laws of physics. Thus, certain fine-grained, realization-dependent (RD) ef-
fects are caused by Pk and it is strictly speaking wrong to insist that, by causal inherit-
ance, M is the cause of those effects too. 
 Contra full causal inheritance, tokens of multiply realizable, supervenient properties 
do not share the causal powers of their subvenient properties; and, a fortiori, mental 
properties do not inherit all the causal powers of their physical realization bases. This 
conclusion has obvious ramifications for Horgan’s (2001) compatibilist defense of 
mental causation according to which causation is a “contextually-parameterized no-
tion”. According to Horgan (2001, p. 102):  
A single phenomenon can perfectly well be subject to a variety of different causal expla-
nations, involving properties from a variety of different counterfactual-dependence pat-
terns at different descriptive/ontological levels. […] The compatibility of these different 
levels of explanation largely stems from inter-level supervenience relations. Since the 
higher-order, psychological patterns and generalizations are supervenient upon underlying 
physical facts and laws, the mental properties that are causal properties at the psychologi-
cal level have their causal efficacy via the causal efficacy of physical causal properties that 
realize them. 
The problem with this view is that, for any RD effect, Erd, the mentalistic counterfac-
tual-dependence pattern does not hold. If you will, the counterfactual P → Erd is true 
while the counterfactual M → Erd is false. Consequently, for any RD effect, there is no 
true mentalistic counterpart to the physical counterfactual dependence pattern for the 
contextual parameter to choose from.  
4.2. Partial causal inheritance: the case of causal compatibilism 
The above conclusion is one that nonreductionists such as Pereboom who endorse 
WCIP are willing to admit. Pereboom (2002, pp. 503-4) agrees that if nonreduction-
ism turned out to be true: 
[…] this reflection would also undermine a token-identity claim for mental causal powers 
―should they exist― and their underlying microphysical causal powers. For if the token 
microphysical realization of M had been different, its token microphysical causal powers 
would also have been different. We therefore have good reason to suppose that any token 
mental causal powers of M would not be identical with the token microphysical causal 
powers of its realization.  
Still, there would be a sense in which the token causal powers of M would be ‘nothing 
over and above’ the token causal powers of P […] For this reason, it makes sense to say 
that token mental causal powers are wholly constituted by token microphysical causal 
powers. 
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 The central, and admittedly more plausible, claim of partial causal inheritance ac-
counts is that there is a class of causal powers of mental events that are realization-
independent (RI), which M can be rightfully said to share with P7. In contrast with the 
RD effect considered above, we might for instance say that the RI effect of acing the 
GRE Verbal section is one that M does cause. Here it seems that the details of the phys-
ical realization base Pk of M are irrelevant to the manifestation of the effect (or, in 
Yablo’s terms, that the “effect is relatively insensitive to the finer details of the physi-
cal implementation” (1992, p. 188)). That is, as long as I instantiated M, this RI effect 
would have ensued, whether I were a Mac Book Pro, a Leibnizian monad or a stu-
dious and gifted college senior. Pereboom’s argument in defense of partial causal inhe-
ritance, if I understand it correctly, makes this sort of claim.  
 One way to back up this claim, of course, is to follow Yablo’s (1992) lead in show-
ing how modal discernibility between M and Pk renders M a better (viz., more propor-
tional) candidate for the role of cause of those RI effects than is Pk. However, Yablo’s 
approach makes use of a counterfactual account of causation-as-dependence that differs 
markedly from the physicalist account of causation-as-production presupposed in the 
causal exclusion problem. Thus, Pereboom is wise not to consider this option, of us-
ing modal discernibility of M and P in his argument for mental causation, if he is to 
consider his a robust, nonreductive materialism. Instead, he embraces the physicalist 
view of causation according to which microphysical properties are inherently causally 
efficacious and then argues that, owing to WCIP, M inherits some causal powers from 
its physical realization base, P. The crux of Pereboom’s view is that, contrary to the 
orthodox physicalist claim that “the causal powers that have a role in explaining the 
dispositional features of mental states are nondispositional properties of their realiza-
tion bases”, a robust nonreductionist should “consider the possibility that there are 
properties intrinsic to mental state types that play a part in explaining their disposi-
tional features” (2002, p. 516). Consequently, he believes that the causal generalization  
m’s instantiating M causes Eri  
is bona fide and indispensible (hence, robust nonreductionism), and in some substantive 
sense independent of the causal generalization  
m’s instantiating Pi causes Eri. 
 This move, of making M intrinsic to m, is supposed to safeguard his account from 
the worries about causal inefficacy with which relational (functional) mental properties 
are riddled. Since functional mental properties are dispositional, they are defined in 
terms of their RI effects; i.e., M: the property which ceteris paribus causes Eri 8. Accord-
ing to Block (1990), Rupert (2006) and others, this feature of functional properties 
                                                     
7 This strategy is at the heart of Yablo’s (1999) defense of mental causation too. RI effects are, in Yablo’s 
terminology, those to which M is proportional. 
8 Previous critics typically call these effects the ‘characteristic’ effects of functional properties. As far as I 
can tell, the characteristic effects of a functional mental property are the realization independent effects, 
i.e., the effects that a functional mental property has independently of the details of the realization base 
by which it is instantiated. 
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renders causal generalizations in which the instantiation of a functional mental prop-
erty figures as one of the causal relata, i.e., generalizations of the form  
m’s instantiating M, the property which ceteris paribus causes Eri, causes Eri 
redundant in a way that undermines their explanatory power. These explanations ex-
press logical rather than nomological relations between a functional property instantia-
tion and an RI effect and so are not causal explanations by any scientific realist stan-
dards. In an attempt to defend mental causation in a nonreductionism framework, Pe-
reboom eschews functionalism by making the causally relevant mental properties in-
trinsic to mental state types. Let us call this Pereboom’s robust nonreductive dictum 
(RN).  
RN: A mental state m type has an intrinsic mental property M that explains 
some of the dispositional features, e.g., the causal powers to bring about RI ef-
fects, of an instance of m. 
 In the remainder of this section, I will argue that this move doesn’t get very far in 
making the mental property causally efficacious with respect to its characteristic RI ef-
fects. Not unlike in the problem of metaphysically necessary effects outlined above, 
mentalistic regularities according to RN are shown not to be properly causal explana-
tory. 
 Since M is intrinsic to m according to RN, every instance of m has M regardless of 
what relations it enters into with the world around it. Additionally, on any view of 
events as property instantiations, M is essential to m. An obvious consequence of this is 
that RN makes M a categorical property of the m-type, i.e., a property that m has eve-
rywhere that it exists and regardless of the relations that m enters into with the world 
around it. This is at least consistent with the criticism directed at functionalism that at 
least some, phenomenal mental properties like the felt experience of painfulness are 
archetypal categorical properties (Yablo 1987, p. 313). But this, as the remainder of my 
argument will attempt to elucidate, is an important hindrance for the RN view because 
the categorical properties of an event-type do not stand in causal relations to the 
event-type’s characteristic dispositions, among which are its powers to bring about RI 
effects.  
 Consider the following example from Mumford about the disposition D of a bil-
liard ball to “roll in a straight line on a flat surface when struck”:  
Various things can roll, but what something must possess if it is to have the disposition is 
a surface, various points of which come into contact, at different times, with the surface 
upon which it rests, so that a change in location is possible. The disposition to roll an in-
definite distance, under suitable circumstances, is possessed by both wheels and billiard 
balls; all that is necessary for this disposition is the possession of a single circumference 
which is rigid to a certain degree. […] A billiard ball can do something a wheel cannot, 
however: it can roll instantly in any direction, according to where it is struck, whereas a 
wheel is limited to certain directions[…]. (Mumford 1994, p. 428).  
 So, the billiard ball also possesses categorically “an infinite number of circumfe-
rences”; also, since it rolls in a straight line, “it is composed of a substance of even 
mass throughout”, and so on. Thus, we arrive by empirical investigation at some cate-
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gorical property or property complex C, being spherical, which grounds or “supports” 
the dispositional property in question, D, rolling uniformly in a straight line when struck. We 
must agree with Mumford that: 
The categorical property C to which D is correlated is indeed correlated contingently, but 
only insofar as the laws of physics are contingent. Given certain laws of nature, the corre-
lation of C to D is necessitated (Mumford 1994, p. 429). 
So the problem with RN is not, like with functionalism, that mentalistic causal genera-
lizations express logical relations ―because they, in fact, express nomological rela-
tions― but rather that they don’t express the right kind of nomological relation, i.e., 
they express what I am calling expository rather than causal relations. On this view, we 
cannot say that the billiard ball’s being spherical, an archetypal categorical property, 
caused it to roll uniformly in a straight line when struck, an archetypal dispositional proper-
ty. By this same reflection, the categorical mental property or property complex of a 
mental event does not cause the dispositional properties, among which figure its pow-
ers to bring about RI effects.  
 To see this, consider another set of regularities that are logically contingent but 
nomologically necessary, viz., criminal laws, and specifically the law regarding underage 
drinking. (In order to draw out the parallel between legal and causal regularities, I will 
pretend that legal laws express “causal*” relations.) To draw the analogy with RN, we 
need to assume that being underage refers to a categorical property of sk that supervenes 
on, but is not identical to, sk’s being nk years old such that anyone who is nk years old is 
underage. Firstly, being underage is essential to sk, since sk cannot be an s (a minor under 
a specific legislation) without having the being underage property, while being nk years old 
is accidental, because sk could have some other specific age, e.g., being nl years old, and 
still be a minor. Secondly, both being nk years old and being underage are intrinsic proper-
ties9. Now consider the RI effect* of being denied the purchase of alcohol. It is RI because, 
regardless of an s’s specific age, as long as the minor’s being her actual age entails her 
being underage, she will be denied the purchase of alcohol. We have two potential 
causal* explanations for this RI effect: 
Janet was denied the purchase of alcohol at t because she was underage at t, 
Janet was denied the purchase of alcohol at t because she was nj years old at t, 
                                                     
9 One might sensibly object that being underage is extrinsic since whether sk is underage depends on what 
particular age is stipulated by the relevant authority as the upper bound of minority. However, as is 
widely accepted, whether a property appears intrinsic or extrinsic is a matter of what we hold fixed. 
The speed of light, c, is by usual standards an intrinsic property because we assume, as part of the in-
variable background conditions, the set of actual physical laws which guarantees that the speed of light 
is c. If we considered the suggestion that there are possible worlds with different sets of physical laws, 
then it would seem that c is an extrinsic property of light which depends on the set of physical laws in 
place. So, for the proposed analogy between legislation and physical laws to hold, let us hold fixed a 
single legislative code such that, if sk is underage, any intrinsic duplicate of sk situated in a different con-
text will also be underage. This has the effect of making the being underage property intrinsic (to all mi-
nors under the relevant legislation) just as mass or speed properties are intrinsic (to physical objects in all 
worlds compatible with the actual physical laws). I owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer for request-
ing this explanation.   
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and two potential causal* generalizations (laws) to account for the above case: 
ELUD: s’s being underage at t causes* s’s being denied the purchase of alcohol 
at t. 
CLUD: s’s being ≤ni years old at t causes* s’s being denied the purchase of al-
cohol at t. 
 The first generalization, ELUD, is expository. It fleshes out what minority is by law, 
by relating two properties that all minors share, viz., the dispositional property of being 
denied the purchase of alcohol and the categorical property of being underage that nomologi-
cally supports the former. CLUD, on the contrary, has the explanatory character of a 
causal* generalization. By elucidating the range of ages, 0 to ni, that result in being de-
nied the purchase of alcohol, CLUD informs us about the nomological regularities in 
place in Janet’s country, viz., the law concerning underage drinking. In this instance of 
causation*, to say that “Janet was denied the purchase of alcohol at t because she was 
nj years old at t”, where nj is an age such that anyone who is nj years old is underage, 
seems to be a stronger candidate for a causal* explanation while “Janet was denied the 
purchase of alcohol at t because she was underage at t”, is more of an expository 
claim. 
 On RN (as on the functionalist view), mentalistic causal explanations ―“Tim cried 
because he was sad”, “Vanessa went to the ice cream stand because she was craving 
ice cream”― fail, in my ears, to do any serious explanatory work. They seem decidedly 
in the business of making expository claims about categorical properties and the dis-
positions they support by nomological necessity. Thus, the relation between being sad 
and crying is of the same kind as the relation between being underage and being denied the 
purchase of alcohol or between being spherical and rolling uniformly in a straight line when struck: 
a relation of nomological support and not of causation10. Pace RN, in order to ge-
nuinely explain the disposition of a mental state m to bring about Eri and thereby dis-
cover a nomological regularity in place in the actual world, one must replace the cate-
gorical supervenient property, M, with the range of accidental subvenient properties 
which realize M by necessity. Thus, the principle by which M inherits the causal pow-
ers of its physical realization base, WCIP, is invalid: if RN is true and M is categorical 
to m, M supports, rather than causes, m’s dispositional properties among which are its 
powers to bring about RI effects. 
5. Reductionism and causal inheritance 
Contemporary reductionist accounts of the mind typically admit multiple realizability 
and, thereby, defend that mental properties are identical to the disjunction of their 
physical realizers, actual and possible. In this section, I will try to show that it is diffi-
cult to see how a disjunctive (mental) property, even if we make room for it in our on-
tology, can inherit the causal powers of its disjunct (physical) properties via CIP-R.  
                                                     
10 See also Segal’s example about the “non-strict law that objects with that very specific sort of red glow 
[that red-hot pokers get] cause wax to melt” (2009, p.91). 
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 It is perfectly meaningful to say that “Wine is either red or white” and, thus, un-
problematic to apply the predicate “being red or white” to wine. It seems clear that we 
do not need to postulate the existence of the being red or white property to explain why a 
disjunctive predication is true. In the arena of psychophysical reduction, this counts as 
a reason to endorse an eliminative reduction about mental properties. This is not a 
promising avenue toward mental causation via causal inheritance since the disjunctive 
predication “being M” fails to correspond to a mental property and refers merely to 
the disjunction of causally efficacious physical properties. It is a system’s instantiating 
Pk that explains why it is true to predicate “is Pk”, and, on the eliminative view, it is al-
so because the system instantiates Pk that it is true of it to predicate “is M”. In this 
way the causal explanations, “M caused sk to E” and “Pk caused sk to E” are both true 
in virtue of sk instantiating the causally efficacious property Pk which has the causal 
power to bring about E. This is why, in a nutshell, eliminative reductions are no path 
to mental causation. More interestingly, we should wonder how mental properties, 
conservatively reduced, could indeed share the causal powers of their physical realizers 
via CIP-R.  
 This consideration requires ex hypothesi that we grant the existence of disjunctive 
properties. An obvious consequence of the existence of disjunctive properties is that, 
for any system si that instantiates a disjunctive property Q, si necessarily instantiates al-
so a disjunct property Ri to which Q is disjunctively identical. Of course if Ri is itself 
disjunctive, then it must also instantiate a disjunct property Si to which Ri is disjunc-
tively identical and so on. Ultimately, any system that instantiates a disjunctive proper-
ty, must also instantiate some sparse, physical property. In the context of mind-body 
relations, we are left with the disjunctive identity relation between a mental property 
and its diverse physical realizers, actual and possible: 
M = P1 ∨ P2 ∨ P3 … ∨ Pn. 
 Now consider the disjunctive property,  
being wine-colored =df being red ∨ being white 
 On the conservative reductionist view, if “The wine bottle I am about to open is 
wine-colored” is true, it must be the case that the relevant wine bottle has the being 
wine-colored property (and, additionally, has either the being red or the being white proper-
ty). What we cannot reasonably defend is that “The wine bottle I am about to open is 
wine-colored” is true in virtue of the bottle’s being wine-colored. The truthmaker for the 
above predication is some sparse property of the wine bottle, i.e., the wine bottle’s be-
ing a particular shade of red or white (Crane, 2008). Similar reasoning renders menta-
listic causal explanations true in virtue of causally efficacious physical properties. To 
see this, suspend any disbelief about color psychology and suppose that, according to 
recent findings in color psychology, there is a detailed account of how looking at a 
sample of red causes the observer to feel warmth and comfort and looking at a sample 
of white causes the observer to feel purity and peace. Now consider the causal expla-
nations with the disjunctive property being wine-colored. 
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Hannah felt warmth and comfort because she contemplated this wine-
colored wine bottle. 
James felt purity and peace because he contemplated that wine-colored 
wine bottle. 
We can, unproblematically, concede that these causal explanations are true. Neverthe-
less, the truthmakers for the above causal explanations in each case are the corres-
ponding causal generalizations below: 
CP1: s’s contemplating red causes s’s feeling warmth and comfort 
CP2: s’s contemplating white causes s’s feeling peace and purity 
 So far, so good: an advocate of CIP-R can agree to this while insisting that we 
should think of an instance of the being wine-colored property as inheriting the causal 
powers of the disjunct property which realizes it at a given time. Well, what if we did 
as she recommends? It is easy to see that the kind of causation that being wine-colored 
would enjoy if we granted its causal inheritance would be a lawless, non-generalizable 
kind. There would be no predicting what a wine-colored thing would do qua wine-colored. 
(This is guaranteed by the multiple realizability of being wine-colored, i.e., the fact that the 
disjunct properties to which being wine-colored is disjunctively identical are not identical 
amongst themselves.) The causal powers of a wine-colored thing would be, in some 
structure-type s, to give rise to feelings of warmth and comfort and, alternatively, in 
some different structure-type s’, to give rise to feelings of peace and purity, and in 
some other possible structure-type, a different range of causal powers yet! If you will, 
RD effects crop up all over again in a reductionist framework. Keep in mind, though, 
that the causal powers of disjunctive properties would not be genuinely anomalous, 
since, at the level of their disjunct physical realizers, they would be perfectly regular 
and lawful. In sum, I frankly don’t see the benefit of claiming causal inheritance in or-
der to give rise to a kind of faux-anomalous causation at the level of disjunctive prop-
erties which is itself fully explainable in terms of regular, causal generalizations at the 
level of their disjunct physical realizers.  
 A lingering worry might be that ―now back to psychophysical reduction― menta-
listic causal explanations turn out false if we give up CIP-R. As I have been exhibiting 
in this section, mentalistic causal explanations remain true even if we surrender to epi-
phenomenalism about mental properties; and this is because, just as disjunctive predi-
cations are true even if we do away with disjunctive properties, mentalistic causal ex-
planations can be true even if mental properties are causally inefficacious: they are 
true, yes, but their truthmakers are causal generalizations at the level of their physical 
realization bases. 
 The arguments I have run through in this paper do not preclude the possibility 
that, if multiple realizability turned out false, mental properties could be said to inherit 
the causal powers of their properly identical physical realizers. Consider the causal inhe-
ritance principle for properly reducible properties: 
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CIP-R*: If mental property M is properly (i.e., nondisjunctively) reduci-
ble in a system si at time t to its physical realization base P, the causal 
powers of this instance of M are identical with the causal powers of P. 
If multiple realizability were false and Mi = Pi, then the causal powers of Mi would be 
identical to ―and as lawful and generalizable as― the causal powers of Pi in virtue of 
CIP-R*. Moreover, mentalistic causal explanations would be bona fide rather than made 
true by lower-level physical causal generalizations. 
6. Conclusion 
The inheritance of causal powers by a multiply realizable, supervenient mental proper-
ty, M, from its physical realizer, P, is problematic in ways that physicalist advocates of 
mental causation have ignored. In the case of nonreductionists, this is because it is 
simply wrong to think that M inherits the causal powers to bring about RD effects 
from P, since it is possible for M to be realized in some different system by some dif-
ferent physical property and in such cases for the instantiation of M to fail to bring 
about the same RD effect. Contra WCIP, M does not inherit the causal powers to 
bring about RI effects either, since, if (owing to RN) M is the categorical property of 
m, then M nomologically supports, rather than causes any dispositional properties of m 
among which are the powers to bring about RI effects. In the case of reductionism, 
claiming causal inheritance via CIP-R results in an ad hoc variety of lawless, causal 
powers at the level of disjunctive properties which are fully explainable by the regular, 
lower-level causal generalizations featuring the physical realizers to which the disjunc-
tive property in question is disjunctively identical. The difficulties with causal inherit-
ance which I have elaborated are silent about the possibility of intrinsic mental causal 
powers. But advocating intrinsic mental causal powers is no easy task for contempo-
rary physicalists. The intrinsic causal powers of mental properties, if there were any, 
could not make a difference to the physical properties of their effects ―because of 
Causal Closure, i.e., because prior physical properties are already causally sufficient for 
them― nor could they make a difference to the mental properties of their effects 
―because of Supervenience, i.e., because mental properties supervene on physical 
properties which, because of Causal Closure, are themselves already causally explained 
by the physical properties of prior events. 
 The two options that, I think, remain open to physicalists about the mind are both 
scientifically respectable. On the one hand, Bickle (2003) has argued that ―while, at 
the systems level, multiple realizability obviously holds― neuroscientific research has 
found, at the level of cellular physiology and molecular neurobiology, unitary realizers 
for psychological kinds which could serve as reduction bases and, consequently, has 
elicited an empirically grounded hope that type-identity theory could resurge. In this 
eventual case, I have argued, mental properties would share the causal powers of their 
physical realizers at the cellular and molecular level in virtue of CIP-R*. On the other 
hand, recent studies in cognitive neuroscience draw out the diverse, unconscious heu-
ristics (Wegner, 2003; Wegner & Wheatley 1999) and illusory mechanisms (Tsakiris & 
Haggard 2003; Wohlschlager et al., 2003) at work in subserving the intuition of agent 
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causation. As this line of research develops, empirically-minded philosophers might be 
prepared to relinquish the forceful intuition of mental causation in favor of an epi-
phenomenalism about mental properties ―a view which, to be sure, commits one nei-
ther to the causal inefficacy of mental states nor to the falsity of psychological causal 
explanations. For those intent on saving mental causation, a third option might be to 
embrace a counterfactual account of causation à la Loewer (2001) and Yablo (1992). 
Undoubtedly there are numerous obstacles to a counterfactual account; to name a 
few, Kim has objected that they don’t distinguish epiphenomenal relations from ge-
nuine causation, and it is unclear whether a counterfactual account, which means ab-
andoning the causal closure of physics, is available to a serious physicalist. If these dif-
ficulties are insurmountable, Kim’s (2003, p. 165) motto will ring true again, “Either 
reduction or causal impotence”, in which case I hope to have shown that the kind of 
reduction required to avoid epiphenomenalism is stricter than what Kim himself has 
in mind. 
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